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Abstract
Stock market average returns and Sharpe ratios are signicantly higher on days when
important macroeconomic news about ination, unemployment, or interest rates is scheduled
for announcement. The average announcement day excess return from 1958 to 2009 is 11.4
basis points versus 1.1 basis points for all the other days, suggesting that over 60% of the
cumulative annual equity risk premium is earned on announcement days. The Sharpe ratio
is ten times higher. In contrast, the risk-free rate is detectably lower on announcement days,
consistent with a precautionary saving motive. Our results demonstrate a trade-o¤ between
macroeconomic risk and asset returns, and provide an estimate of the premium investors
demand to bear this risk.
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I. Introduction
The link between macroeconomic risk and security returns is central to nancial economics.
While a lot of relevant information about the economy arrives randomly over time, certain
important macroeconomic news is released in the form of pre-scheduled announcements,
whose dates are known months in advance. Investors do not know what the news will be, but
they do know that there will be news. If asset prices respond to this news, the risk associated
with holding securities will be higher around announcements, and this will be anticipated by
rational investors.
An extensive prior literature, which we discuss below, presents evidence consistent with
a higher conditional risk of holding nancial assets ahead of macroeconomic announcements.
Risk-averse investors who know that they will be exposed to higher risk should demand, and
in equilibrium receive, a higher expected excess return during those times (provided that this
risk is priced by investors as a group). Stock returns should thus be predictably higher on
announcement days, and this is the main hypothesis we explore in this paper (rather than
studying the impact of announcement surprises on realized returns). For example, if investors
prefer to avoid ination risk, then times of ination announcements must be times of higher
average excess returns over a su¢ ciently long time period (one in which the average surprise
equals zero).
Consistent with this general idea, we nd that average U.S. stock market returns from 1958
to 2009 are signicantly higher on days when important macroeconomic news is scheduled to
be announced. On days when the Consumer Price Index (CPI), Producer Price Index (PPI),
employment gures or Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) decisions are released,
excess market returns average 11.4 basis points (bps) versus only 1.1 bps for all the other
days. These gures imply that compensation for bearing macroeconomic announcement risk
accounts for a large portion of the equity risk premium, as over 60% of the cumulative annual
excess return is earned on just 13% of the trading days, whose timing is known to investors
well in advance. Conversely, the risk premium for holding stocks at other times is very low,
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with the average excess return on those days not being statistically distinguishable from
zero.1
Despite this evidence of a signicantly higher announcement day risk premium, we nd
that the realized volatility of daily stock market returns is only 4% higher. The e¤ect on
implied volatility is larger than for realized volatility, but the magnitudes are still much
lower than those for the di¤erence in returns. The stock markets realized Sharpe ratio is
therefore ten times higher on announcement days; a myopic investor would need to exhibit
implausibly high risk aversion in order to account for this di¤erence.
One explanation consistent with our results requires a positive dependence of stock market
returns on state variables such as expected long-run economic growth and ination. Intu-
itively, stocks tend to perform particularly poorly when news about the state of the economy
is negative, making them much riskier than just their volatility would suggest. Given that
scheduled economic announcements presumably reveal important information about the econ-
omy, this state variable risk should be deterministically higher at such times.2 Risk premia
can therefore increase on announcement days, even if conditional volatility does not change.
This explanation can reconcile the large announcement e¤ect on risk premia with the small
e¤ect on observed return volatility and the corresponding di¤erence in Sharpe ratios. In-
triguingly, it implies that the major component of the equity premium is compensation for
exposure to news about the state of the economy: macroeconomic risk.
This argument also suggests that periods of high uncertainty about the direction of the
economy should be times when the di¤erence between announcement and non-announcement
day returns is especially high, and we conrm this hypothesis. We estimate that a doubling
of stock market variance increases the di¤erential by 60%.
1By contrast, we nd that the average excess return on days of unscheduled FOMC announcements is
strongly negative (-89.2 bps for 15 such days between 2001 and 2009). This is consistent with the prescheduled
nature of the announcements in our tests being the crucial characteristic driving di¤erences in risk premia.
2In support of this hypothesis, we nd that in the second half of our sample period announcement day
returns predict consumption growth signicantly better than non-announcement returns.
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Higher risk on announcement days should also a¤ect the risk-free rate. Increased risk can
raise desired saving by risk-averse investors to insure against adverse states of the world. In
equilibrium, increased precautionary saving demand should reduce returns on the risk-free
asset, and we nd strong support for this prediction. The average holding period return
on 30-day U.S. Treasury bills (our proxy for the daily risk-free rate) is 0.7 bps lower on
announcement days, relative to the sample mean of 2.2 bps, with a t-statistic of above 10.
For longer-term Treasury securities, which are not riskless assets at a daily horizon,
the di¤erence between average announcement and non-announcement day returns increases
monotonically with a bonds maturity, as we would predict if investors expect higher returns
on riskier assets on announcement days. Treasury bonds with maturities over one year behave
similarly to the stock market, with higher excess returns, similar volatilities, and consequently
signicantly higher Sharpe ratios on announcement days relative to non-announcement days.
Our results hold over the full 1958-2009 sample (1961-2009 for Treasuries), are almost
unchanged in various subsamples, are robust to exclusion of outliers, and hold separately
for each type of announcement. They are also not explained by various calendar anomalies,
including the January e¤ect, the day-of-the-week e¤ect (French (1980), Gibbons and Hess
(1981)), the turn-of-the-month e¤ect (Ariel (1987), Lakonishok and Smidt (1988)), the rst-
half-of-the-month e¤ect (Ariel (1987)), the holiday e¤ect (Ariel (1990)), and seasonality
induced by payment lags (Flannery and Protopapadakis (1988)).
It is possible that the post-war period in the U.S. was an unusually good time for equities,
with economic growth consistently beating expectations and a benign ination experience.
If these unexpectedly favorable developments were revealed primarily through scheduled an-
nouncements, this could explain our nding that stock returns on announcement days are
signicantly higher.3 However, our results remain the same if we include controls for an-
nouncement surprises, which we either estimate directly or compute using forecasts by the
Society of Professional Forecasters. Furthermore, the announcement day premium is present
3An analagous argument can be made for long-term bonds.
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in nine out of ten ve-year subsamples starting in 1958, some of which do not seem to coincide
with positive economic conditions.
A number of papers investigate the sensitivity of realized returns to the news component
of scheduled macroeconomic announcements. For instance, a positive ination shock (an
announcement of an ination number higher than the market expectation) may induce a
negative contemporaneous stock market return. In the language of factor models, these papers
investigate factor betas as opposed to factor risk premia. Formally, given an announcement
day surprise zt+1, dened as the di¤erence between the announced number and its forecast,
a test asset return rt+1 is decomposed into its conditional expectation and its residual:
(1) rt+1 = Et[rt+1] + zt+1 + "t+1:
Starting with Schwert (1981), Pearce and Roley (1983), Pearce and Roley (1985), Hardou-
velis (1987), Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1989), Orphanides (1992), McQueen and Roley
(1993), Krueger (1996), Fleming and Remolona (1997), Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001),
Bomm (2003), and Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson (2005) study the responsiveness  of
stock or bond returns to various macroeconomic shocks zt+1. More recently, Boyd, Hu, and
Jagannathan (2005) explore the sensitivity of security returns to unemployment surprises,
and nd a positive stock market response to news of rising unemployment during economic
expansions (a positive ) and a negative response during contractions (a negative ). An-
dersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2007) use a high-frequency futures data set and get
a similar result that the stock market response to macroeconomic news depends on general
economic conditions. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) analyze the impact of FOMC interest
rate announcement surprises on stock market returns.
Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002) estimate a direct announcement e¤ect on contem-
poraneous returns through the sensitivity to announcement news  together with an indirect
e¤ect through higher conditional volatility of shocks "t+1 (even if  equals zero) on announce-
ment days. They employ a GARCH model to identify which macroeconomic surprises (out of
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17 candidates) inuence realized equity returns or their conditional volatility. They come up
with three variables (CPI, PPI, and the monetary aggregate) for which there exists a relation
between surprises and returns, and only one of those (the monetary aggregate) a¤ects returns
both directly and indirectly.4 ;5
By contrast, this study focuses on the e¤ect of pre-scheduled announcements on expected
returns Et[rt+1]. We identify the magnitude of the di¤erence between expected returns on
announcement days versus expected returns on other days for the stock market, long-term
bonds, and T-bills. As a consequence, we are not directly interested in the announcement
surprise zt+1 but rather in the average realized return over a long sample. This means we do
not need to make assumptions about market expectations for a given variable or even about
what exactly constitutes good or bad news at any particular point in time.6 We also do not
need to know the size or sign of , as long as we accept the results of the earlier studies that
nd that  is di¤erent from zero, and therefore announcement days are periods of higher
systematic risk. Jones, Lamont, and Lumsdaine (1998) adopt a methodology similar to ours
and nd that both the mean excess returns for long-term Treasury bonds and their volatilities
are higher on PPI and employment announcement days.7
Our results could be related to the well-known phenomenon of high average stock returns
4The nding that unexpected ination and money growth negatively a¤ect stock prices is not new. See
Bodie (1976), Nelson (1976), Fama and Schwert (1977), Ja¤e and Mandelker (1979), Fama (1987), Schwert
(1981), Geske and Roll (1983), Pearce and Roley (1983), and Pearce and Roley (1985) for previous studies
establishing this relation.
5Brenner, Pasquariello, and Subrahmanyam (2009) estimate a similar GARCH framework for stock,
Treasury, and corporate bond markets that allows for an announcement day e¤ect on the mean through a
variance-in-mean channel, but nd no evidence of a positive statistically signicant e¤ect on average excess
returns.
6It is not always obvious how the market will interpret a particular macroeconomic shock. For example,
if the stock market response to news of rising unemployment depends on concurrent economic conditions, a
lower than anticipated number could represent bad news. Similarly, lower than expected ination in Japan
in recent years was not necessarily good news for investors.
7We document a similar result in our sample.
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for rms announcing earnings. This earnings announcement premium was rst discovered by
Beaver (1968) and was subsequently conrmed by Chari, Jagannathan, and Ofer (1988), Ball
and Kothari (1991), Cohen, Dey, Lys, and Sunder (2007), Frazzini and Lamont (2007), and
Savor and Wilson (2011), who all nd that the above-average returns around earnings an-
nouncement days do not appear to be explained by increases in risk. Kalay and Loewenstein
(1985) obtain the same nding for rms announcing dividends. While potentially similar,
our results are easier to interpret in the framework of a rational choice equilibrium, since
we do not need to distinguish between the idiosyncratic component of announcement day
risk and the systematic component. It is not immediately clear to what extent rm-level
announcement risk can be diversied away, but macroeconomic announcement risk surely
cannot be diversied to any signicant extent.
Our explanation for the documented announcement day premia focuses on a risk-return
trade-o¤ that compensates investors for higher macroeconomic risk around announcement
days. An interesting alternative possibility is that even myopic investors e¤ectively become
more risk-averse ahead of announcements, resulting in a higher price of stock market variance.
Such investors could be averse to uncertainty in the sense proposed by Knight (1921). With
an announcement approaching, their utility functions become more concave as the worst
possible distributions of outcomes receive higher weights.8 Other potential explanations
include the changing composition of investors participating in stocks and T-bills ahead of
announcements, which would alter the risk aversion of the representative investor, or an
irrationally excessive investor aversion to announcement risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents a simple model deriv-
8Skiadas (2008) shows that for small risks (a large probability of a small change or a small probability
of a large change) many of the preferences in the current literature are, to a rst-order approximation,
equivalent to expected utility or Kreps-Porteous recursive preferences, so that ambiguity aversion need have
no rst-order e¤ects on asset prices when risks are small. Pre-scheduled announcements, however, are the
quintessential large risk: they are events involving the near certainty of a non-negligible change (even if
zero-mean). Thus, even standard ambiguity aversion can deliver higher risk prices ahead of announcements.
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ing all of our main predictions; Section III reports our principal results and relates them
to our model; Section IV shows additional supporting evidence; and Section V concludes.
Derivations of our propositions are given in the Appendix.
II. Announcement Risk in an Endowment Economy
Our intuition is that times around scheduled macroeconomic news announcements are periods
of foreseeably higher systematic risk, and that consequently expected excess returns on risky
assets should be higher during those periods. In equilibrium, this intuition can also imply
that risk-free rates should be lower during the same periods. Here we analyze this idea in
a formal model of scheduled announcements in an endowment economy with a single Lucas
tree and a single representative investor with recursive preferences, in which ination and
real interest rates are stochastic. All derivations are placed in the Appendix.
The central idea of our model is that investors learn more about the state of the economy
on announcement days than on other days. Investors are rewarded not just for bearing market
risk but also state variable risk, which we dene as the risk of learning that the economy
is performing worse than expected. Consequently, risky assets whose returns have high
covariance with the state variable can earn much higher risk premia around announcements,
even if the volatility of their returns is not very di¤erent. Such assets include the overall
stock market and long-term nominal bonds. Since these assetsreturns have a larger common
component on announcement days, they should comove more around announcements. The
model shows how this idea can be made consistent with general equilibrium by equating
the state variable in the Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model of Merton (1973) with
long-term expected consumption growth in an endowment economy, as in Bansal and Yaron
(2004).
The primary purpose of the model is to demonstrate that all of the announcement e¤ects
we document are consistent with a rational expectations equilibrium. The model also makes
it easier to understand which forces may be driving our ndings and suggests additional
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testable hypotheses. Most of our empirical work is not directly testing this model; to the
extent that it is possible, we do so in Section IV.C.
II.A. Real Economy
Log real aggregate dividends (which equal the endowment), dt = lnDt; follow
(2) dt+1 = t + d;t+1:
The expected growth of the endowment (the drift), t, varies randomly over time, follow-
ing an AR(1) process:
(3) t+1 = (1  )+ t + ;t+1:
The conditional variances of both news terms are both higher on announcement days:
(4) V art[x;t+1] = 2x;L + (
2
x;H   2x;L)At+1;
for x = d; , where At+1 is a deterministic indicator variable that equals one if there is a
pre-scheduled announcement between dates t and t+1 and zero otherwise, and x;H > x;L.
The exposition is considerably simplied if we assume that news about current and expected
future endowment growth are uncorrelated.
This model is essentially that of Bansal and Yaron (2004) with the addition of determinis-
tic changes in variances due to announcement e¤ects, and we use a similar approximation to
solve the model in closed form. Note that the announcement e¤ects on variances are assumed
and the model is used to derive the resulting announcement e¤ects on prices and expected
returns.
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II.B. Preferences
A representative investor chooses an optimal consumption path and invests in a claim to the
aggregate endowment and a risk-free asset. The investor has recursive Epstein-Zin preferences
(5) Ut =

(1  )C1 
1
 
t + (Et[U
1 
t+1 ])
1  1
 
1 
 1
1  1
 
;
where  is the time discount rate,  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, and  is the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS). When  = 1= , these preferences nest the
special case of power utility. Market clearing requires Ct = Dt.
We use recursive Epstein-Zin utility rather than the simpler power utility, because in
our equilibrium model power utility has some empirically unattractive properties (when risk
aversion is greater than one). Specically, as noted by Bansal and Yaron (2004), increases
in aggregate risk induce an increase in desired precautionary saving, which in equilibrium
reduces expected returns on all assets (the wealth e¤ect) and reduces desired portfolio weights
on riskier assets (the substitution e¤ect). Assuming investors have power utility preferences
requires the wealth e¤ect to dominate the substitution e¤ect, implying that valuations of even
risky assets should be increasing in aggregate risk (holding cash ows constant). Furthermore,
under power utility, changes in expected consumption growth do not a¤ect risk premia. The
more general Epstein-Zin framework avoids these unappealing implications.9
9See Bansal, Khatacharian, and Yaron (2005) for evidence that both higher aggregate uncertainty and
lower expected consumption growth decrease risky asset valuations.
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II.C. Real Risk-free Rate
In equilibrium, the investor consumes the aggregate endowment Dt each period, and the
risk-free asset is in zero net supply. The equilibrium log risk-free rate is then given by
rft+1 =   ln  + 1
 

t +
1
2
V art [dt+1]

  

1 +
1
 

1
2
V art[dt+1](6)
 

   1
 

1  1
 

V art


1  t+1

:
The log risk-free rate consists of four terms. The rst term depends on the rate of time
preference. The second depends on the log expected growth rate of consumption. This term
is independent of risk aversion , but not of risk V art[dt+1] because of Jensens inequality:
for risk-neutral investors, an increase in the variance of log dividend growth increases the log
risk-free rate because log expected dividend growth increases, reducing desired saving.
The third term is a precautionary saving term that is zero for risk-neutral investors.
For risk-averse investors, an increase in aggregate risk raises desired precautionary saving,
reducing the market-clearing risk-free rate. The precautionary saving e¤ect of increased risk
dominates the e¤ect through the second term if and only if investors are su¢ ciently willing to
substitute consumption across time (increasing in  ) relative to their willingness to substitute
across states (decreasing in ). A necessary and su¢ cient condition for the risk-free rate to
be decreasing in aggregate risk is that   ((1=)  1). Since  is weakly positive, this
condition is always fullled for investors with greater than unit risk aversion.
The fourth term is an additional precautionary saving term proportional to the variance
of the permanent component of shocks to expected endowment growth. This term is zero
for both investors with unit elasticities of intertemporal substitution and for investors with
power utility. For the case of  and  greater than one, this term reduces the risk-free rate
on announcement days. Risk-averse investors who are highly willing to substitute future for
current consumption (those with high  ) are most prone to changing their desired consump-
tion plans in response to permanent changes in consumption growth. Such investors will wish
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to save more as the variance of such news increases (holding the risk-free rate constant).
The total precautionary savings e¤ect on the risk-free rate is the sum of the third and
fourth terms, and will be higher on announcement days provided  and  are both greater
than one. Since investors are long-lived, any such additional desired saving cannot be very
large, but even long-lived investors put some weight on smoothing consumption from day to
day.
II.D. Stock Market Returns
The log return on the risky claim to the aggregate endowment is
rMKT;t+1 =   ln  + (   1)(1  1
 
)
1
2
V art

d;t+1 +

1  ;t+1

+
1
 
t(7)
+d;t+1 + (1  1
 
)

1  ;t+1:
Expected market returns are higher on announcement days provided ( 1)(1  (1= )) >
0. For the leading empirical case of  > 1, this condition requires the elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution  to be greater than one.10 Investors desire both to increase saving (a
wealth e¤ect) when aggregate risk increases and to substitute out of risky into risk-free assets
(substitution e¤ect). Provided that  > 1, the substitution e¤ect will dominate the wealth
e¤ect, so that in equilibrium expected returns on risky assets will increase, while those on
very low-risk assets will decrease.
10Recent work by Bansal and Yaron (2004), Bansal, Tallarini, and Yaron (2008), Vissing-Jorgenson (2002),
and others presents evidence and arguments in favor of  > 1.
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The conditional market risk premium is
lnEt

1 +RMKT;t+1
1 +Rf;t+1

= Et[rMKT;t+1]  rf;t+1 + V art[rMKT;t+1]
2
(8)
=  Covt[mt+1; rMKT;t+1]
= V art[dt+1] + (   1
 
)(1  1
 
)V art


1  t+1

= V art[rMKT;t+1] +
   1
 
Covt

rMKT;t+1;

1  t+1

:(9)
It will be higher on announcement days provided  is not too low. For the special cases of
power utility or unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution, the variance of the permanent
component of shocks to economic growth (the second term) does not a¤ect consumption.
When both  and  are greater than one, the market risk premium is increasing in the
variance of this permanent component. Thus, market risk premia can be considerably higher
on announcement days if investors expect to receive more news about future economic growth
on such days.
In this model, the market risk premium is not necessarily proportional to its conditional
return variance. Since the stock market return exhibits a positive covariance with permanent
shocks to expected economic growth, conservative investors (those with  > 1) will demand
higher risk premia on announcement days even if the increase in market variance is small.
Such investors require compensation for the tendency of the market to perform poorly when
news about future economic growth is bad. In consequence, Sharpe ratios can be much higher
on announcement days.
II.E. Nominal Bonds and Ination
In order to model announcement e¤ect on bonds, we next introduce ination shocks. The log
dollar price of an N-period nominal discount bond is p$n;t and its real holding period return is
(10) rn;t+1 = p$n 1;t+1   p$n;t   t+1;
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where  is the log rate of ination. We assume
(11) t+1 = zt + ;t+1
and expected ination zt follows
(12) zt+1 = (1  ) + zt + z;t+1:
Once again, the conditional variances of realized ination and expected ination shocks
are higher on announcement days. The structural source of ination and its relation to
real variables is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we assume that neither shocks
to realized or expected ination are correlated with shocks to realized endowment growth
d;t+1. The signs of the correlations between expected ination and expected real endowment
growth and between realized ination and expected endowment growth are discussed below.
Following Campbell and Viceira (2002), chapter 3, it is helpful to write out the dependencies
of the ination shocks on each other and on shocks to the drift:
(13) z;t+1 = zv;t+1 + "z;t+1
and
(14) ;t+1 = v;t+1 + z"z;t+1 + ";t+1:
The shocks v;t+1, "z;t+1, and ";t+1 are orthogonal but have higher variances on announce-
ment days. The loadings (z, , and z) are assumed to be the same on all days for
simplicity. In order to generate a positive ination risk premium, we require that z be
negative, so that shocks to expected ination are negatively related to shocks to expected
economic growth.
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II.F. Nominal Bond Risk Premia
In real terms, consistent with the rest of this section, risk premia on nominal bonds are given
by
Et[rn;t+1]  rf;t+1 + 1
2
V art[rn;t+1] = Covt[ mt+1; p$n 1t+1   p$nt   t+1](15)
=

   1
 


1  V art

t+1
  1
 
1  n 1
1    
1  n 1
1   z   

:
The risk premia depend on three terms. The rst term is the risk premium on an N-period
real bond. When either  and  are both greater or both less than one, this implies that risk
premia are lower on announcement days by an amount increasing in magnitude with bond
maturity. Since the short-term real interest rate depends positively on expected endowment
growth, and real long-term bond holding period returns are negatively correlated with the
short-term real rate, long-term real bonds o¤er desirable hedges against the risk of a decline
in expected economic growth. As this risk is higher on announcement days, longer-term real
bonds should underperform by more on such days.
The second term depends negatively on the covariance between shocks to expected ina-
tion and shocks to expected real endowment growth. In order to generate a positive ination
risk premium, this covariance must be negative. Although there is evidence that the ination
risk premium may have declined over time, most studies agree that it has always been pos-
itive (see, for example, Buraschi and Jiltsov (2007) and Campbell, Sunderam, and Viceira
(2009)).
Finally, the third term depends negatively on the covariance between shocks to realized
and expected ination and expected economic growth. The sign of this covariance is a matter
of debate, but it is likely to be small in magnitude and is the same for all maturities.
The risk premium on two nominal bonds with maturities n + 1 and n is increasing in
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maturity, and higher on announcement days, provided
(16)  z >
1
 



n 1
For su¢ ciently short-term bonds the risk premium can decline with maturity and will be
lower on announcement days. The model therefore predicts that for short-term bonds the
average excess returns on announcement days can be lower than on non-announcement days,
but should always be higher for longer-term bonds.
III. Evidence on Announcement Day Returns
III.A. Pre-scheduled Macroeconomic Announcements
We obtain dates of pre-scheduled monthly macroeconomic news announcements from the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics from 1958 to 2009 and from the Federal Reserve from 1978 to 2009.
We have 157 pre-scheduled CPI announcements from January 1958 to January 1971 and 467
for the PPI from February 1971 to December 2009. We drop the CPI after PPI announce-
ments become available in February 1971, since PPI numbers for a given month are always
released a few days earlier, thereby diminishing the news content of CPI numbers.11 We have
621 employment announcements from January 1958 to December 2009. FOMC interest rate
announcements start in January 1978 and end in December 2009. Before February 1994, we
assume the FOMC decision became public one day after its meeting (as in Kuttner (2001)).
We exclude any unscheduled announcements, leaving us with 279 FOMC observations. 51
of the announcement days in our sample had more than one announcement, while a further
23 were non-trading days. The remaining sample contains 1,450 announcement days versus
11,641 non-announcement days. Interestingly, only 29 of the pre-scheduled announcements
in our sample occurred on a Monday, representing about 2% of overall announcements. In
the second half of our sample, there is only one Monday announcement.
Our choice of announcement types is primarily dictated by the availability of data. CPI is
11Our results are robust to the inclusion of CPI announcements after January 1971.
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the rst macroeconomic variable for which the Bureau of Labor Statistics issued regular news
releases (according to data available on its website), followed four years later by employment.
We need a long sample for our analysis to ensure the average surprise is close to zero, so
that announcement day returns do not reect a period of particularly good or bad news.12
Moreover, both employment and ination clearly constitute important macroeconomic news,
as do FOMC announcements.13
Our measure of stock market return is the daily return on the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted NYSE/Nasdaq/Amex all share index, including div-
idends. To calculate excess returns, we infer a daily risk-free rate from the monthly risk-free
rate (obtained from Kenneth Frenchs website), assuming it to be constant over the month.
This biases downwards our estimate of the di¤erence in average excess returns between an-
nouncement and non-announcement days, since we also nd evidence consistent with a lower
daily risk-free rate on announcement days.
We obtain daily Treasury bill (T-bill) returns from the CRSP daily Treasuries le starting
in June 1961 (the rst date available) and ending in December 2009. Our proxy for the
overnight risk-free rate is the daily return on the T-bill in the CRSP le with maturity
closest to 30 days.14 Our results do not depend on the exact choice of the number of days
until maturity.
For Treasury securities with longer maturities, we use returns provided by CRSPs Daily
Treasury Fixed Term Indexes File. These returns are meant to reect the performance of a
hypothetical Treasury bond with xed maturity, and are calculated using a procedure similar
to the one we employ for calculating our daily risk-free rate.
We obtain constant-maturity 30-day implied volatility from the CBOE S&P 100 Vix
12A long sample should also address potential critiques based on the peso problem hypothesis.
13See Jones, Lamont, and Lumsdaine (1998), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), and Boyd, Hu, and Jagan-
nathan (2005) for further evidence of the variablesrelevance.
14The CRSP le contains very few observations for bonds with initial maturities of less than 6 months.
As a result, hardly any of the bills in our sample are on-the-run 30-day T-bills.
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index, available daily beginning in 1986. These volatilities are then squared to convert them
into variances, and the daily di¤erence from market close to market close is calculated.
Estimates of the change in stock market risk based on prices at a point in time such as
implied volatilities could be more accurate than estimates based on realized volatility.
III.B. Stock Market Excess Returns
Table 1 presents our main result: the average excess return on the stock market is 11.4 bps
on announcement days versus 1.1 bps on other days. The di¤erence between the returns
on the two kinds of days averages 10.3 bps and a t-test for a di¤erence in means (allowing
for di¤erent variances) gives a t-statistic of 3.77. The non-announcement day returns are
not only much lower but are actually not even statistically signicant (t-statistic = 1.29).
Excluding outliers (observations outside the 1st and 99th percentiles of each sample), the
average excess returns are 11.7 and 1.3 bps, respectively, with a t-statistic for di¤erent means
of 4.55, and the non-announcement day returns are only marginally signicant (t-statistic =
1.88). This evidence suggests that macroeconomic risks represent important priced factors
for stock returns, as the observed equity risk premium is much higher on announcement days.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Our hypothesis is that announcement days are fundamentally riskier than other days.
The standard deviation of announcement day returns is 98.6 bps versus 94.6 bps for other
days (81.8 versus 75.4 when excluding outliers), and we can reject the hypothesis of equal
variances at the 5% signicance level. However, the dispersion of announcement day returns
is only 4-6% higher, so that the Sharpe ratio is about ten times higher compared to non-
announcement days. Furthermore, announcement day returns exhibit equal skewness as
those on other days, and the distribution of announcement day returns has a thinner left
tail than the non-announcement day distribution.15 It appears that announcement days are
not riskier simply because the distribution of announcement day returns is less attractive
15This remains true even if we exclude the October 1987 market crash, although there is obviously no
good reason to exclude such events when evaluating tail risk.
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to a myopic investor. Consequently, if announcement day risk premia are higher because of
higher fundamental risk, this must be because of higher exposure to state variable risk on
announcement days.16
Table 2 shows evidence from regressions of returns on an announcement day dummy
together with controls. The regression coe¢ cients are estimated using ordinary least squares
(OLS), and t-statistics are computed using Newey-West standard errors (with 5 lags, but our
results do not change with di¤erent specications).17 Panel A is for the full sample of 13,091
days and Panel B excludes outliers using the same cut-o¤s as above. The rst column of each
panel reproduces the di¤erence-in-means result of Table 1: the announcement day dummy
has a signicantly positive coe¢ cient. We then control for market return lagged one day and
squared lagged market return. The coe¢ cient on the lagged market return is positive and
signicant, in accordance with previous work. Finally, we include day of the week dummies
for Monday through Thursday. The presence of these dummies should absorb any impact
on returns by di¤erent days of the week, which may stem from payment lags, higher or
lower trading activity on particular days, or behavioral biases. We conrm that returns are
signicantly lower on Mondays (even excluding outliers) and otherwise nd no signicant
day-of-the-week e¤ects. The announcement day e¤ect remains positive and highly signicant
in all specications, although slightly lower once day-of-the-week e¤ects are included.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
16Pollet and Wilson (2010) show that, when the stock market is a poor proxy for the portfolio of aggregate
wealth, changes in the average correlation between stock returns can nevertheless reveal changes in aggregate
risk. We use estimates of daily average correlation based on intraday returns starting in 1995, and nd that
the mean announcement day correlation equals 0.245 versus 0.216 on other days (with a t-statistic for the
di¤erence of 3.78). This result suggests, as do our ndings on realized and implied volatility, that aggregate
risk is higher on announcement days, but that the increase is not of the same order of magnitude as the
increase in risk premia.
17Our ndings remain unaltered if we instead jointly estimate announcement day e¤ects on both the
mean and conditional volatility (using a GARCH(1,1) model similar to the one used in Jones, Lamont, and
Lumsdaine (1998)). These results are available on request.
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We do not include the contemporaneous announcement surprise in our controls. We take
this approach for two reasons. First, because the correlation between the true announcement
surprise and the announcement day dummy (which is deterministic) is zero by denition, its
exclusion does not bias our estimates of the announcement day e¤ect (whereas the inclusion of
a poorly estimated surprise may bias them). Second, the magnitude and even the sign of the
response coe¢ cient to the surprise may well vary over time, which complicates any analysis
relying on these coe¢ cients. For example, Boyd, Hu, and Jagannathan (2005) show that
unemployment shocks have opposite impact on stock returns in expansions and recessions.
In our robustness tests, we show that controls for announcement surprises have no e¤ect on
our ndings.
III.C. Risk-free Rate
Table 3 presents ndings on the distributions of announcement day and non-announcement
day returns on 30-day T-bills. Our sample starts slightly later (1961, rather than 1958), but
is otherwise identical to the stock market sample of announcements.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Panel A shows that the average announcement day return for 30-day T-bills is 1.5 bps
versus 2.3 bps for non-announcement days. The di¤erence of 0.7 bps is statistically signicant
with a t-statistic of 14.49, and is also economically signicant relative to the sample mean
of 2.2 bps. The respective standard deviations are 1.6 and 2.5 bps. 30-day T-bill returns
are actually less volatile on announcement days, but the main point is that both of these
volatilities are extremely small, as one would expect if these returns represented good proxies
for the risk-free rate. The distribution of announcement day returns on 30-day T-bills is
everywhere below that of non-announcement day returns.
The statistical signicance of the result that 30-day T-bill returns are lower on announce-
ment days is stronger if outliers are excluded, with the t-statistic for the di¤erence increasing
to 21.4. The exclusion of outliers is more important in this case because of the greater pos-
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sibility of data error, resulting from the fact that the prices of bond trades are not reported
to an exchange.
Table 4 gives our regression results. As before, column 1 of Panel A reproduces the
di¤erence-in-means result. Column 2 controls for lagged return and lagged squared return.
Not surprisingly, T-bill returns are highly autocorrelated, but the announcement day e¤ect
is still highly signicant. Column 3 controls for day-of-the-week e¤ects. Returns on T-bills
appear to depend strongly on the day of the week, but, even with the inclusion of dummies
for di¤erent days, the announcement day e¤ect is still very signicant (although substantially
smaller). We conclude that the evidence is consistent with increased announcement day risk
reducing the risk-free rate.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Our regression shows that T-bill returns are extraordinarily high on Mondays. One po-
tential explanation for this is the existence of a weekend e¤ect for T-bills: three days pass
between the Friday T-bill price observation and the Monday observation, whereas only one
day passes between all other consecutive price observations (excluding holidays).
In unreported tests, we raise the gross Monday return for T-bills and Treasury bonds to
the power of one third and repeat our analysis. (This adjustment is not necessary in the case
of stock market returns, as in their case the random component dominates the deterministic
component due to the passing of time.) Since Monday is almost never an announcement
day, this procedure distinguishes between an announcement day e¤ect on daily T-bill and
bond returns and a mere weekend e¤ect. Crucially, all our ndings continue to hold with
this adjustment.
III.D. Treasury Bond Excess Returns
In contrast to T-bills, government securities with longer maturities represent risky assets at
a daily horizon. If held to maturity, long-term Treasury bonds will provide a guaranteed
(nominal) rate of return, but in the meantime their daily price changes will not be fully
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predictable and will reect factors such as changes in interest rates. The possibility of such
changes can result in longer-term bonds displaying greater di¤erences between announcement
and non-announcement day returns.18
Our model predicts that at long maturities government bonds should have higher excess
returns on announcement days and that the di¤erence should be increasing with maturity,
provided that ination risk premia are positive and shocks to expected ination are more
persistent than shocks to expected economic growth. At the short end of the term structure,
it is possible for real interest rate risk premia to dominate ination risk premia, and thus
short-term bond average excess returns can be lower on announcement days (see equation
(16)).
This hypothesis is conrmed by the data. Figure 1 shows how the di¤erence between
announcement and non-announcement day excess returns varies with a bonds maturity. As
predicted, the performance di¤erential uniformly increases as we increase a bonds time-to-
maturity. For a 1-year bond, the average announcement day excess return is actually 0.5
bps lower than the average on other days, with a t-statistic of 2.22. This suggests 1-year
bonds are relatively riskless assets (at a daily horizon). However, as we increase a bonds
maturity, its announcement day returns become higher than non-announcement day returns.
For 5-year bonds, the return di¤erential is 2.6 bps (t-statistic = 2.57), and it then grows to
3.4 bps (t-statistic = 2.23), 4.1 bps (t-statistic = 2.04), and 4.5 bps (t-statistic = 2.02) for
10-, 20-, and 30-year bonds respectively. These ndings for longer-dated Treasury securities
are similar to those reported in Jones, Lamont, and Lumsdaine (1998) for the 1979-1995
period, and are consistent with the hypothesis that investors expect higher returns on riskier
assets on days when macroeconomic news is scheduled to be released.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
18E.g., simple up or down shifts in the yield curve will have the greatest impact on the Treasury bonds
with the longest maturities.
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III.E. Can the Same Parameters Account for All Announcement E¤ects?
Our model proposes a unied explanation for announcement e¤ects on the risk-free rate,
the equity risk premium, and bond risk premia. Having presented our main results, it is
now appropriate to ask whether the model provides a quantitatively as well as qualitatively
satisfactory explanation. To address this issue, we show and discuss the results of a simple
calibration exercise.
Given that equation (6) requires  and  to both be greater than one for the risk-free rate
e¤ect to exist, we choose other parameters for the model that can match our estimates for
the stock market. Specically, for  = 1:2 and  = 1:001, we can choose other parameters
to match the announcement and non-announcement day market average excess returns and
volatilities of returns perfectly.19 For example, setting  = 0:836; Ad = 15:4%; 
N
d = 15:0%;
A = 4:4%; and 
N
 = 8  10 11%, all quoted on an annualized basis and assuming 250
trading days per annum, generates the required moments.
Are these numbers also consistent with observed bond and T-bill returns? For bond risk
premia, we nd that we can generate all the observed announcement and non-announcement
day average excess returns almost perfectly (with a root mean squared error of 0.25 bps)
if we assume  = 0:833 (annualized), z =  1:07, and  = 0. Actual (implied) bond
average excess returns (expressed in bps) are then: 0.0 (0.1) for 1-year notes; 3.1 (2.8) for
5-year notes; 3.6 (4.0) for 10-year bonds; 4.3 (4.3) for 20-year bonds; and 4.5 (4.5) for 30-year
bonds. For non-announcement day average excess returns, all are predicted by the model to
be zero, which is quite close to the actual estimates of 0.4, 0.5, 0.2, 0.4, and 0.1 respectively.
We conclude that the same parameters of the model can match both stock market and bond
risk premia (given stock market variance) on both announcement and non-announcement
days for bond maturities of one year and above.
With these parameters, the implied di¤erence between the average risk-free rate on an-
19The value of  cannot be too high as a lower bound for N is zero. At that point, equation (8) sets 
equal to the price of market risk on non-announcement days, which we estimate to be very low. Given a low
, and very similar market variances on both types of day, equation (7) then requires  to be close to one.
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nouncement days and non-announcement days is -10.2 bps, as opposed to an actual reduction
of -0.7 bps. The model implied reduction is thus nearly fteen times too large in magnitude.
Inspection of equation (6) shows that the announcement day e¤ect on the risk-free rate con-
tains a term that is equal and opposite to the e¤ect on the stock market risk premium, and
that the other terms are likely to be small, given the small observed di¤erence in market
return volatility. Since the risk premium increases by over 10 bps on announcement days,
the model-implied e¤ect on the risk-free rate is counterfactually large at around -10 bps.
Why might the actual e¤ect on the risk-free rate be far smaller than the one implied
by our model? One possible explanation is that ours is a representative agent endowment
model in which bonds and bills are assumed to be in zero net supply. When the agent wishes
to reduce his holdings of risky assets, there is no other agent to accommodate him, so the
risk-free rate must fall to o¤set his increased demand. In reality, cash, bills and other close
substitutes may be much more elastically supplied (relative to equities and long-term bonds),
thereby reducing the impact of announcement risk on the risk-free rate relative to the impact
on equities or bonds.
III.F. Announcement Surprises
A possible alternative explanation for our central results is that announcement returns have
a high realized Sharpe ratio in our sample because 1958-2009 has been a period of unusually
benign economic conditions for the U.S., and investors mainly learned this on announcement
days. We now evaluate this idea. We note, however, that this explanation implicitly concedes
that announcement days are riskier, since these are the days when investors learn the state
of the economy. Furthermore, the announcement e¤ect on market returns is present in all
but one consecutive 5-year subperiod in our sample, so that investors would have had to
be surprised on the upside not just over the entire 1958-2009 period but also in each 5-year
subperiod except one.
A straightforward test of this "good-news hypothesis" is to run the following regression
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for our test assets:
(17) Rt = 0 + St + At + Controlst + "t;
where R is the asset return, S is the unexpected component of an economic announcement,
A is an announcement day dummy, and Controls is a set of controls. If the sample average
S is positive, then omitting S might bias upwards our estimate of the announcement e¤ect
.
Any estimate of the announcement surprises bSt from a regression with a non-zero intercept
will have a zero in-sample mean. Therefore, we must use pseudo out-of-sample forecast errors
for announced ination and unemployment when estimating regressions. For interest rate
announcements, we use federal fund futures, as in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), and the
surprise is then just the di¤erence between the FOMC decision and the futures price-implied
interest rate prediction.
To forecast unemployment, we use the model in Boyd, Hu, and Jagannathan (2005)
(BHJ), equation (1):
Unemt   Unemt 1 = b0 + btIPt 1 + b2IPt 2 + b3IPt 4(18)
+b4(Unemt 1   Unemt 2) + b5TB3t + b6BAt + "t;
where Unem is the unemployment rate, IP is the growth rate of monthly industrial pro-
duction, TB3 is the change in the 3-month T-bill rate, and BA is the change in the default
yield spread between Baa and Aaa corporate bonds (all monthly). We get Unem and IP
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and TB3 and BA from Global Financial Data. We
compute forecasts using rolling regressions starting in 1953 (so that the forecast in period t
is calculated using coe¢ cients estimated with data from 1953 to period t  1).
To forecast ination, we use an IMA(1,1) model, as in Nelson and Schwert (1977) (with
monthly data) and Stock and Watson (2007) (with quarterly data). Stock and Watson (2007)
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present evidence that this forecast performs as well as any other over our sample period. The
moving average coe¢ cient is estimated using a ten-year rolling window of past observations.
Since BHJ show that the impact of economic news may vary depending on the business
cycle, we also include specications in which we interact surprises with expansion and re-
cession indicators.20 As an additional check, we repeat our analysis using median forecasts
from the Society of Professional Forecasters (SPF), available from the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia and starting in the third quarter of 1981 (for ination). These are only
reported quarterly, so we use the same SPF forecast for each month in a given quarter.
Table 5 reports the results for the stock market (Panel A) and the risk-free rate (Panel
B) as dependent variables. In summary, our estimates of the announcement e¤ect on both
expected market returns and risk-free rates are una¤ected when we include announcement
surprises as controls. The announcement dummy coe¢ cient in the stock market return regres-
sion is 8.1 (7.6 with no business cycle indicators) when we use forecasts from equation (18)
and 11.3 (9.6 with no business cycle indicators) when we use SPF forecasts (with the sample
starting in 1982 in the latter case). These coe¢ cients are strongly statistically signicant and
quite close in magnitudes to the estimates with no announcement surprise controls.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
In the T-bill regressions, the coe¢ cients on the announcement dummies are -0.15 using
both model-based and SPF forecasts. Again, they are all highly signicant and very similar
to the ones calculated when announcement surprise controls are omitted. The only surprises
with signicant impact on T-bill returns are FOMC ones, which is exactly what we should
expect (it would be quite worrying if T-bill prices did not respond to federal funds rate
changes).
Perhaps surprisingly, no announcement surprises have a statistically signicant impact
on stock market returns in any of our specications. At rst glance, this seems to conict
20For example, if negative unemployment surprises represent good news in recessions and bad news in
booms, the average news might have been good in our sample even if the average surprise equaled zero.
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with the results in BHJ (for unemployment) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) (for FOMC
decisions). However, when we restrict our sample to the same period as the one in BHJ
(1972-2000), we get results that are similar in magnitudes and statistical signicance. We
can also replicate the results in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) when we add unscheduled
FOMC announcements to our sample. It seems that their ndings are driven exclusively by
interest rate changes that occurred outside of the regular FOMC meeting schedule.
In unreported tests, we nd that our results for Treasury bonds also hold when we add
announcement surprises as controls. Taken together with our nding that stock market
announcement e¤ects exist in all but one 5-year subperiod in our sample, we conclude that
it is unlikely that our results can be explained by good average announcement news during
the 1958-2009 period.
III.G. Subsamples and Other Robustness Tests
Our ndings hold separately in each half of the sample, with the di¤erence between announce-
ment and non-announcement day stock market returns (8.7 bps in the 1958-1983 period vs.
11.4 bps in the 1984-2009 period) and risk-free rates (-0.7 and -0.6 bps) almost the same across
the two subsamples. This further strengthens the case that the announcement day premium
is not a temporary phenomenon or a chance occurrence. The results are also present for each
type of announcement. When we divide the sample further into consecutive 5-year periods,
the stock market excess return is higher on announcement days in 9 out of 10 periods, and
the T-bill returns are lower in 9 out of 10 periods.
The announcement day returns are higher for all 10 Fama-French industry portfolios, with
the di¤erence being statistically signicant for every industry except for Durables and Tele-
phone and Television Transmission. Finally, various calendar anomalies, such as the January
e¤ect, the turn-of-the-month e¤ect (high equity returns over a four-day interval beginning
with the last trading day of the month, rst discovered by Ariel (1987) and Lakonishok
and Smidt (1988)), the rst-half-of-the-month e¤ect (positive stock returns only during the
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rst half of calendar months, as in Ariel (1987)), the holiday e¤ect (good stock market per-
formance ahead of market holidays, documented by Ariel (1990)), or seasonality in returns
induced by payment lags (Flannery and Protopapadakis (1988)), do not explain any of our
results.21 ;22
IV. Additional Tests and Other Supporting Evidence
In this section we show additional results on announcement day e¤ects.23 We present ev-
idence that the announcement day excess return increases with conditional stock market
variance, while there is no corresponding e¤ect for non-announcement days (i.e., at times
of high uncertainty, the announcement day risk premium is higher); that stock market im-
plied variance is higher immediately before announcements; that announcement day returns
predict consumption growth better than non-announcement day returns, though only in the
second half of our sample; and that the stock market betas of government bonds are much
higher on announcement days and the di¤erence in betas is increasing with maturity.
IV.A. Conditional Variance and Stock Market Excess Returns
Our basic argument is that investors demand compensation for the higher risk of learning bad
news about the state of the economy on announcement days, resulting in a higher expected
return on these days. In times of high uncertainty, the risk of learning bad news is higher
than in normal times. Consequently, the di¤erential between returns on announcement and
non-announcement days should be greater during such periods. It is interesting to note that
announcement day returns were on average particularly high during the crisis period in 2008
and 2009, even though some of the worst announcement day returns in our sample occurred
then.
21We control for these e¤ects by introducing dummies for each calendar month, a dummy for the four
trading days around the turn of the month, a dummy for the rst half of a month, dummies for trading days
just before and just after a holiday, and holiday dummies interacted with day-of-the-week dummies.
22All these results are available on request.
23All of these ndings are implied by our model, but we do not formally derive every prediction.
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In more formal terms, the higher Sharpe ratio of announcement day stock market returns
indicates that most of the di¤erence between announcement and non-announcement returns
is due to higher state variable risk and not to higher market variance. It is then simple to
show that this di¤erence is increasing in the conditional variance of the market return.24
To test this hypothesis, we run the same regression specication as in Table 2 but add
as dependent variables the lagged realized variance of stock returns and its interaction with
the announcement day dummy. We use the realized variance (over the last 100 trading days)
as a proxy for the conditional variance, as in Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001).
The coe¢ cient on the interaction term (using demeaned variance) is signicantly positive
with a t-statistic of 2.22. By contrast, the variance coe¢ cient on its own is negative and not
statistically signicant. The point estimates imply that a doubling of stock market variance
from its sample mean increases the announcement day risk premium by 6.0 bps (relative to
the sample mean of 11.4 bps), while not a¤ecting (or even reducing if we use the insignicant
coe¢ cient on the realized variance) the non-announcement day risk premium.25 This evidence
is consistent with our model, and further supports the hypothesis that announcement days
are fundamentally riskier.
IV.B. Implied Variance
Our model predicts a drop in Vix, or other Black-Scholes implied volatility measures, from
before to after announcements. Intuitively, one can think of 30-day ahead Vix as a "portfolio"
of 1-day conditional volatilities. When a high-volatility day, such as an announcement day,
drops out and is replaced by a low-volatility one, the "portfolio" volatility drops. We present
results on squared implied volatility (implied variance) as these are slightly easier to interpret.
Panel A of Table 6 gives summary statistics for the percentage change in implied variance
24See Appendix, equation (A-19).
25The mean announcement day variance is 9586 bps2. The interaction coe¢ cient is 0.00077 and the
variance coe¢ cient is -0.00014. A doubling of variance then increases the expected excess return by 9586 *
0.00077 - 9586 * 0.00014.
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from previous day market close to following day market close, and compares the changes on
announcement days to those on non-announcement days. The average announcement day
change is -1.5% whereas for other days the average change is an increase of 1.4%. Both
estimates are statistically signicant and the di¤erence is large and highly statistically signif-
icant (t-statistic = 4.30). The median change in implied variance around non-announcement
days is e¤ectively zero. The median change around announcement days is -2.9%, and the
distribution of announcement day changes lies everywhere below the distribution of non-
announcement day changes. When we exclude outliers in Panel B, our ndings remain the
same and become even more signicant.
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
In untabulated results, we also run a regression of implied variance on an announce-
ment dummy with controls for lagged changes in implied variance, the square of such lagged
changes, and day of the week dummies. None of the results in Table 6 are materially a¤ected.
In sum, our evidence strongly suggests that the implied variance falls after macroeconomic
news is released. Ederington and Lee (1996) obtain a similar result for interest rate options,
while Dubinsky and Johannes (2005) document a decline in implied volatility for individual
stock options after earnings announcements.26
IV.C. Covariance with Consumption Growth
Our explanation for the much higher Sharpe ratio of announcement day stock returns is that
investors face higher state variable risk on these days. In our model, this state variable risk
is equated to the risk of learning that future economic growth, and therefore consumption
growth, will be lower than expected. A literal test of our model would then check whether
26Beber and Brandt (2009) use prices of economic derivatives to measure macroeconomic uncertainty, and
show that implied volatilities of stock and bond options decline more after news releases when uncertainty
is high. Li and Engle (1998) and French, Leftwich, and Uhrig (1989) show a reduction in return volatil-
ity immediately prior to a pre-scheduled announcement for the bond and the agricultural futures markets,
respectively.
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stock market announcement day returns predict future consumption growth better than non-
announcement day returns.
Table 7 shows the results of this test. Our measure of consumption is the log real per
capita consumption based on NIPA consumption data, taken from Martin Lettaus website
and available at a quarterly frequency. We include three lags of consumption growth as
controls (we nd that only the rst three are signicant). We sum all the announcement day
excess returns in a given quarter t to obtain cumulative announcement day returns and do
the same for non-announcement day excess returns. Their sum, rAq;t + r
N
q;t; is the cumulative
market excess return in quarter t.
The rst three columns show the results of regressing quarterly consumption growth in
quarter t on quarter t  1 cumulative announcement and non-announcement returns for the
full sample (consumption data end in the third quarter of 2009), the rst half of the sample
(1958 Q1 to 1983 Q4), and the second half (1984 Q1 to 2009 Q3). In the full sample, both
types of return forecast future consumption growth. The coe¢ cient on announcement day
returns is 0.018 (t-statistic = 2.34) versus 0.010 for non-announcement day returns (t-statistic
= 2.84). In the rst half, only non-announcement day returns are signicant (t-statistic =
2.97), while in the second half only announcement day returns are signicant (t-statistic =
2.75).
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
The next three columns run the same regressions but replace the levels of returns with the
di¤erence between cumulative announcement and non-announcement day returns, rAq;t   rNq;t;
and their sum, the cumulative market return. If the coe¢ cient on the di¤erence is posi-
tive, we can then reject the null that announcement day returns predict future consumption
growth equally or less well than non-announcement day returns. The coe¢ cient on the dif-
ference is not signicant in either the full sample or in the rst half. However, in the second
half announcement day returns predict future consumption growth signicantly better than
returns on non-announcement days, with a coe¢ cient on rAq;t  rNq;t equaling 0.008 (t-statistic
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= 2.39). This nding is consistent with investors facing a higher risk of learning bad news
about future consumption on announcement days. It is important to emphasize here that in
a typical quarter there are 55 non-announcement days and only eight announcement days,
but cumulative announcement day returns still o¤er more information about next quarters
consumption growth despite this preponderance of non-announcement days.
Why does our prediction about consumption growth only hold in the second half? An in-
depth investigation of this question is beyond the scope of the current paper, but we suggest
three possible explanations, all of which are also consistent with the nding that R2 is almost
twice as high in the second half. First, consumption data may be of poorer quality in the
earlier period. Wilcox (1992) shows that NIPA data are likely to contain signicant sources
of error. Second, the stock market participation rate has increased over time and is much
higher in the second half than the rst half (see, for example, Bertaut and Starr-McCluer
(2000) and Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004)). As argued by Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and
Parker (2001), it is only stockholder consumption that should covary with stock market
returns. Third, ination was more volatile in the early half of our sample, and investors
may have overestimated real consumption growth as a result of underestimating ination in
that period. Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) argue that ination illusion is a signicant
source of potential stock mispricing, and in particular that stock market participants appear
to underestimate future real dividend growth when ination is high, as hypothesized by
Modigliani and Cohn (1979).27
27Consistent with this explanation, we nd that in the rst half of our sample, in a similar test but
replacing real with nominal consumption growth, cumulative announcement day returns predict nominal
consumption growth better than non-announcement day returns (with a marginally signicant t-statistic of
1.63). In the second half, only real consumption growth is better predicted by announcement day returns.
These results are available from the authors on request.
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IV.D. Bond Betas
Table 8 shows betas of government bonds with respect to the stock market return. We
regress the excess return of Treasury bonds with di¤erent maturities on the stock market
excess return, the announcement day dummy, and the interaction term between the two.
The coe¢ cient on the announcement day dummy corresponds to the chart in Figure 1: it
is negative for the shortest horizon (t-statistic =  2.71) and then becomes positive for a
5-year horizon (t-statistic = 2.41) and continues increasing monotonically with bond matu-
rity. While 1-year bonds underperform on announcement days, those with longer maturities
outperform, and this outperformance increases as maturity goes up.
We observe a similar pattern for bond betas. The interaction term, which measures
the di¤erence between bond betas on announcement and non-announcement days, is always
positive and signicant, and it increases with the maturity of the bond. The di¤erence is
0.010 (t-statistic = 4.26) for 1-year bonds, and it then monotonically rises to 0.112 (t-statistic
= 5.79) for 30-year bonds. With the exception of those with a 20-year maturity, Treasury
bonds do not move together with the stock market on non-announcement days. In contrast,
on announcement days this comovement is always signicantly positive.
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE]
This evidence is consistent with the existence of a priced common factor to stock and
bond returns on announcement days that is less present at other times. It is also predicted
by our model if the announcement day increase in the variance of news about expected future
consumption growth is greater than the announcement day increase in the variance of news
about current growth. In other words, provided the information that arrives specically on
announcement days is more relevant to state variables such as expected economic growth or
expected ination, as opposed to realized economic growth or realized ination, bonds and
stocks should comove more around announcements.
This point is perhaps most easily understood by considering an extreme but empirically
plausible case. Suppose: (1) the only sources of time-variation in expected returns are
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expected economic growth and expected ination; (2) investors learn nothing about current
growth through announcements and nothing about expected future growth or ination (and,
by implication, interest rates) other than through announcements; (3) shocks to expected
ination are negatively correlated with shocks to expected economic growth; and (4) shocks
to realized ination and economic growth are independent of each other and of everything
else. Since bond returns depend only on news about nominal interest rates, bond returns
will be deterministic on non-announcement days and their market betas will be zero. On
announcement days both the market return and bond returns will respond negatively to
news that future ination will be higher than anticipated, so bond betas will be positive and
increasing with maturity.
V. Conclusion
We show that average excess returns and Sharpe ratios on the U.S. stock market are much
higher on days when important macroeconomic news is scheduled to be announced. This
di¤erence is especially pronounced at times of high risk. We also nd that returns on 30-day
T-bills, our measure of the risk-free rate, are signicantly lower on these days. For longer-
term Treasury securities, which are not riskless assets at a daily horizon, we nd that the
di¤erence between announcement and non-announcement day returns uniformly increases
with a bonds maturity and is positive for bonds with maturities of ve years or more. Bonds
comove much more with the stock market on announcement days, and this tendency also
monotonically increases with maturity.
Our results demonstrate a clear link between macroeconomic risk and nancial asset
returns. Investors seem to require higher expected returns on risky assets as a compensation
for bearing risks associated with macroeconomic news. In addition, the risk premium on
non-announcement days appears to be very low, with our numbers implying that over 60% of
the cumulative annual excess return for the stock market is earned on announcement days.
Our ndings on risk-free rates are consistent with precautionary saving. If aggregate risk
35
is higher on announcement days, then investors who care about daily changes in their wealth
will seek to save more out of current wealth on those days relative to other days. To our
knowledge, this is some of the rst evidence of precautionary saving a¤ecting asset prices.
These results are consistent with a simple equilibrium model of economy-wide risk that
varies deterministically over time because of pre-scheduled announcements. This model can
reconcile the large increase in stock market risk premia with the relatively small increase in
stock market variance that we estimate. Because investors learn more about future economic
conditions around announcements, they should be less willing to hold assets, such as stocks,
that covary positively with these news, even if the variance of their returns is itself not
much higher. If such shocks are persistent, even a small increase in their volatility (the news
arrival rate) around announcements can result in large increases in the market risk premium.
A reasonable calibration of our model produces risk premia and volatilities that match our
empirical results. We also provide direct evidence that investors learn more about future
consumption growth on announcement days, though this nding is only signicant in the
second half of our sample.
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Appendix. Proposition Derivations
A.1. Proof of Equations (6), (7) and (8)
For a representative investor with Epstein-Zin preferences, the stochastic discount factor
is given by
(A-1) mt+1 = lnMt+1 =  ln    
 
dt+1   (1  )rMKT;t+1;
where rMKT is the log return on the market portfolio, dened as the claim to aggregate
dividends in perpetuity, and  = (1  )=(1  (1= )).
Since everything is log-normal, the log return on any asset rj;t+1 is then given by
(A-2) Et[mt+1 + rj;t+1] +
1
2
V art[mt+1 + rj;t+1] = 0
In order to solve the model ,we use the Campbell-Shiller approximation for the log return
on the market portfolio
(A-3) rMKT;t+1  k +dt+1 + (pt+1   dt+1)  (pt   dt);
where k is an unimportant constant and  = (1 + exp(d  p)) 1 is another constant that is
slightly less than one. We assume that announcements are not spaced through our sample in
such a way that the mean log dividend-price ratio is badly dened. A su¢ cient condition is
that announcements are regularly spaced, so that in any long period, such as one year, there
is a xed number.
Next we assume that the log aggregate price-dividend ratio is linear in the drift term t
and its intercept is a deterministic function of time:
(A-4) pt   dt = a0;t + a1t
As in Bansal and Yaron (2004), a1 is positive and the price-dividend ratio is increasing
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in expected dividend growth if and only if  > 1, so that the direct e¤ect on wealth through
increased growth more than o¤sets the indirect e¤ect through a higher discount rate due to
higher expected growth.
The solution implies that the stochastic discount factor is given by
(A-5) mt+1 =  t+1   1
 
t   vd;t+1   (  
1
 
)

1  v;t+1;
where
(A-6) t+1 =   ln    (1  )(   1
 
)
1
2
V art

d;t+1 +

1  v;t+1

Iterating (A-4) forward one period gives
(A-7) pt+1   dt+1 = a0;t+1 + a1t+1
Plugging these into the approximation (A-3) for the log market portfolio return, then
plugging the derived expression into the pricing equation (A-2), given the equation for the
stochastic discount factor (A-1), and equating coe¢ cients gives:
(A-8) a1 =
1  1
 
1  
and
(A-9) a0;t = b0 + b1At+1 + a0;t+1
conrming our conjecture. Here
(A-10) b0 = ln  + k + a1(1  )  1
2
(   1)(1  1
 
)
 
2d;L +


1  
2
2;L
!
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and
(A-11) b1 =  1
2
(   1)(1  1
 
)
  
2d;H   2d;L

+


1  
2  
2;H   2;L
!
Assuming no rational bubbles implies
(A-12) lim
s!1
sEt[pt+s   dt+s] = 0
hence
lim
s!1
sa0;t+s + lim
s!1
sa1Et[t+s] = lim
s!1
sa0;t+s + a1 lim
s!1
s(A-13)
= lim
s!1
sa0;t+s = 0
hence
(A-14) a0;t =
b0
1   + b1
1X
j=1
jAt+1+j
Plugging back into the approximation (A-3) gives equation (7). Equation (6) follows from
substituting (7) into (A-1). Subtracting equation (6) from equation (7) gives equation (8).
A.2. Derivation of nominal bond risk premia
The price of a nominal bond is derived by conjecturing that
(A-15) p$n;t = c
n
0;t + c
n
1t + c
n
2zt;
where cn0;t is a deterministic function of time and maturity and the other coe¢ cients depend
only on maturity. Since the log price of $1 is zero, all coe¢ cients equal zero at n = 0. Since
the bonds real return is p$n 1;t+1 p$n;t t+1, iterating forward, plugging the conjecture into
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equation (A-2) and equating coe¢ cients conrms the conjecture and in particular gives
cn1 =  
1
 
1  n
1  (A-16)
cn2 =  
1  n
1  (A-17)
Equations (15) and (16) follow.
A.3. Changes in Stock Market Variance
Equation (8) holds both on announcement days and non-announcement days. The di¤er-
ence in market risk premium rpMKT;t = lnEt [(1 +RMKT;t+1)=(1 +Rf;t+1)] is therefore:
(A-18)
rpAMKT;t   rpNMKT;t = 
 
V art[r
A
MKT;t+1]  V art[rNMKT;t+1]

+
   1
 

Covt

rAMKT;t+1;

1  
A
t+1

  Covt

rNMKT;t+1;

1  
N
t+1

    1
 

Covt

rAMKT;t+1;

1  
A
t+1

  Covt

rNMKT;t+1;

1  
N
t+1

The approximation follows because the di¤erence in variance of stock market returns be-
tween announcement and non-announcement days is negligible, so that AMKT;t =
q
V art[rAMKT;t+1] 
NMKT;t = MKT;t.
Now assume (for simplicity) that the correlation MKT; is constant and does not vary
across days. Dening 2;t = V art[t+1],
(A-19) rpAMKT;t   rpNMKT;t =
   1
 
MKT;MKT;t(
A
;t   N;t)
which is increasing in 2MKT;t.
A.4. Stock Market Implied Volatility
Our model has implications for Black-Scholes implied volatilities, such as the CBOEs
(old) Vix index. Under the assumptions of the Black-Scholes model, the square of the implied
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volatility of a  -day option (assuming no dividends are paid between dates t and t+ ) is the
conditional variance of the log  -day ahead price pt+ :
(A-20) 2;BS = V art[lnPt+ ] = V art [pt+ ]
Since
(A-21) pt+ = (pt+   dt+ ) + dt+
the Black-Scholes implied variance is approximately
(A-22) 2BS;t 
 
1  1
 
1  
!2
V art
"
X
j=1
 j;t+j
#
+ V art
"
X
j=1
d;t+j
#
The model-implied change in the square of constant-maturity Black-Scholes implied volatil-
ity from the day prior to an announcement to the end of the following day is therefore
(A-23)
2BS;t+1 =
 
2d;H   2d;L

(At+1+   At+1)+
 
2;H   2;L
 1  1 
1  
!2 X
j=1
 
 j
2
(At+1+j At+j);
where  is the number of days until expiration of the options from whose prices the implied
volatility is derived. In the case of Vix,  is standardized to 30 days and is quoted on an
annualized basis, so will change by (365=30)2BS;t+1 from date t to date t+ 1.
This change consists of two terms. First, if date t+ 1 is an announcement day and date
t+ 31 is not, then squared implied volatility will decline by an amount equal to the increase
in variance of dividend growth around announcement days. Intuitively, one can think of Vix
as a "portfolio" of 30 individual daily implied volatilities, so when a high volatility day is
replaced by a low volatility one, this term of Vix should drop by 2d;H   2d;L.
The second term is more complex, since it depends not only on the day added and the
day subtracted, but also on the intervening days. Since the persistence of shocks to expected
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growth is less than one, the impact of announcements today on the conditional variance
of t+ will be smaller than the impact of an announcement later in the next 30 days. In
particular, if At+31 is also an announcement day, this second term in Vix could actually
increase by a small amount at date t + 1. However, At+31 = 1 and At+j = 0 for j = 2:::30
maximizes the increase in this second term for any value of . Furthermore, the second highest
value, if At+31 is zero, is negative for any value of . Thus, provided we assume At+31 = 0
for all dates t, the model predicts a drop in Vix from before to after announcements. This
assumption, if false, biases against our nding the results we report in the paper.
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Figure 1. The Di¤erence between Announcement Day and Non-announcement
Day Treasury Bond Excess Returns. The chart plots the di¤erence between the mean
announcement day excess return and the mean excess return on other days for Treasury
bonds of di¤erent maturities. Treasury bond returns are obtained from the CRSP Fixed
Term Indices File. The di¤erence is expressed in basis points (bps). * and ** indicate sta-
tistical signicance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively.
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